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What can cognitive science tell us about
scientific revolutions?
Abstract
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is notable for the readiness with which
it drew on the results of cognitive psychology. These naturalistic elements were
not well received and Kuhn did not subsequently develop them in his pub-
lished work. Nonetheless, in a philosophical climate more receptive to natu-
ralism, we are able to give a more positive evaluation of Kuhn’s proposals. Re-
cently, philosophers such as Nersessian, Nickles, Andersen, Barker, and Chen
have used the results of work on case-based reasoning, analogical thinking, dy-
namic frames, and the like to illuminate and develop various aspects of Kuhn’s
thought in Structure. In particular this work aims to give depth to the Kuhnian
concepts of a paradigm and incommensurability. I review this work and iden-
tify two broad strands of research. One emphasizes work on concepts; the other
focusses on cognitive habits. After contrasting these, I argue that the conceptual
strand fails to be a complete account of scientific revolutions. We need a broad
approach that draws on a variety of resources in psychology and cognitive sci-
ence.
1 Introduction
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions is a work intended to have philo-
sophical significance but which draws most of its resources from history of science.
Structure has had enormous influence in both philosophy and history or science.
It has also had a great deal of influence in the sociology of science (and social the-
ory more widely). Perhaps surprisingly, for all that Kuhn’s ideas were adopted and
developed in sociology, Kuhn’s own appeals to works in sociology in Structure are
few. Rather more numerous are Kuhn’s references to works in psychology. Kuhn’s
interest in psychology was largely ignored in the decades following the publication
of Structure. The one exception to the latter concerns Kuhn’s remarks drawing on
Gestalt psychology, which received a hostile reception from philosophers, with little
real attempt to understand what Kuhn was seeking to do with those ideas.
One reason why his philosophical contemporaries dismissed Kuhn’s appeal to
Gestalt psychology and ignored his discussion of experimental results in cogni-
tive psychology, for example those stemming from the work of Kuhn’s Harvard col-
leagues, Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman, is that such references to the results of
empirical science in supporting an argument with philosophical conclusions were
unfamiliar in philosophy. While this kind of naturalism is now part of the philo-
sophical landscape, it went against the purely aprioristic grain of philosophy in the
1960s.1
1Mention of examples from psychology was not itself unprecedented. Hanson’s Patterns of Discovery
(1958) also does this. But Hanson’s illustrative use of psychological cases is different from Kuhn’s evi-
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However, now we are indeed open to naturalistic approaches, with the work of
the sciences playing a part in the construction and assessment of philosophical the-
ses, we should revisit Kuhn’s interest in cognitive psychology. We should ask how his
theories may be developed and evaluated in the light of research in psychology and
cognitive science that has been carried out since the publication of Structure. In this
paper I report on two broad ways in which such work has been deployed to develop
Kuhnian themes. The first starts with the exemplar idea and argues that training
with exemplars can inculcate certain cognitive habits, which may be used to explain
the functioning of paradigms in normal science as well as the phenomenon of of
incommensurability in revolutionary science. This approach takes its cue primarily
from Kuhn’s work in Structure. The second draws upon work on concepts in cogni-
tive science; the most advanced work here is that by Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker,
and Xiang Chen, drawing upon the work of Lawrence Barsalou on dynamic frames.
Because the second approach is focussed on concepts, and because Kuhn’s interest
in issues of meaning grew after the publication of Structure, that approach draws to
a greater extent on Kuhn’s later writings. My own view is that the first approach is
potentially the more fruitful. I shall argue that the second approach is rather less
comprehensive than it claims in its ability either to articulate Kuhn’s theory of sci-
entific revolutions or to understand the revolutions themselves.
2 Exemplars
I share Kuhn’s view that the idea of an exemplar is the most novel aspect of The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970: 187). He said that it was also the least well
understood, and matters in this regard are a little better now than forty years ago,
but not much. The preceding logical empiricist view of scientific cognition is that
the process of generating new ideas in science is a matter of creativity and is to be
understood by psychology if it can be understood at all; this is the context of dis-
covery. Entirely separate is the context of justification whereby an idea, say a new
hypothesis, is evaluated against the evidence. This is the epistemic cornerstone of
the scientific method. The relationship is supposed to be an apriori one, and it is the
task of philosophers to clarify its details. A good example of this kind of approach
is Hempel’s deductive-nomological account of confirmation: a hypothesis h is con-
firmed by evidence e in the light of background knowledge of relevant conditions c
if and only if e is deducible from h∧c.
Kuhn’s proposal is radically different. First, the relevant unit of assessment is not
the hypothesis but is the puzzle-solution. Secondly, the logical empiricists held that
the hypothesis is evaluated against (total relevant) evidence, whereas Kuhn holds
that the evaluation of a proposed puzzle-solution the relevant evidence, and also the
puzzle itself and the puzzle-solving tradition from which it comes. Thirdly, whereas
whereas the logical empiricists held the evaluation relation to be a logical and apri-
ori one, Kuhn does not think that evaluation of a proposed puzzle-solution is apriori.
Indeed, the relationship between puzzle and proposed solution may differ from field
to field. How how do we assess whether the relationship is a good one? The prin-
cipal cognitive process involves perceiving similarities between, on the one hand,
the package of puzzle-plus-proposed-solution, and, on the other hand, an exem-
dential use. Furthermore, in Kuhn’s hands those examples added to the (mistaken) impression that he
was promoting an irrationalist picture of science, whereas there was no perception of such an agenda in
Hanson’s work.
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plary package of past-puzzle-plus-its-solution. The exemplary puzzle solution is
the paradigm in the narrow sense: a past success held up by the scientific commu-
nity as a model of how science is done in this field. There are of course questions
to be asked about why this exemplary puzzle solution should have that status, to
which Kuhn has some answers. But for current purposes, we need to note that what
justifies a proposed puzzle solution in the eyes of the community is the perceived
similarity between that new puzzle solution and the existing paradigm. Perceiving
similarity here is akin to the process of cognition involved in seeing that John looks
like his sister Jane, or the ability of a connoisseur to recognize the painter of a paint-
ing she has not seen before. These are genuine acts of cognition, but they are not
to be understood along the aprioristic lines of the logical empiricists. Here is how
Kuhn (1970: 189) sees this at work in learning science:
[Students] regularly report that they have read through a chapter of their
text, understood it perfectly, but nonetheless had difficulty solving a
number of the problems at the chapter’s end. Ordinarily, also, those
difficulties dissolve in the same way. The student discovers, with or
without the assistance of his instructor, a way to see his problem as
like a problem he has already encountered. Having seen the resem-
blance, grasped the analogy between two or more distinct problems, he
can interrelate symbols and attach them to nature in the ways that have
proved effective before.
Connoisseurship in art provides an instructive illustration of the cognitive pro-
cesses involved in scientific puzzle-solving. The art dealer and historian Bendor
Grosvenor (2011) explains,
The ability to tell almost instinctively who painted a picture is defined
. . . as connoisseurship. The word is derived from the Latin cognoscere,
to get to know. The theory is that the repeated study of an artist’s work
allows one to become so familiar with his or her style and technique that
they can be easily recognized, just as we may recognize the author of a
letter not from the signature at the end, but from the handwriting at the
beginning.
The key here is repeated study. It is by exposure to the works of an artist and their
study that one can recognize other works by the same artist. The resulting ability is
almost instinctive, by which I take it that Grosvenor means that the knowledge is not
mediated by a lengthy process of ratiocination. One can know without having a full
appreciation of exactly on what basis one knows. Interestingly, Grosvenor does not
think that immediate instinctive response is quite right either:
In 1939 the noted art historian Max Friedlander wrote,“The way in
which an intuitive verdict is reached can, from the nature of things, only
be described inadequately. A picture is shown to me. I glance at it, and
declare it to be a work by Memling, without having proceeded to an ex-
amination of its full complexity of artistic form.” Unsurprisingly, only
about half of Friedlander’s attributions have stood the test of time.
Grosvenor thinks that connoisseurship can be supplemented by science, in which
case it cannot be an unreflective response. Furthermore, we should note the con-
trast between Grosvenor’s emphasis on study and ‘close looking’ and Friedlander’s
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‘glance’. Intuition comes about as a result of a deep acquaintance with the exemplar-
paintings and careful study of the puzzle-painting. The successful connoisseur will
look carefully at the brush-work, the pigments used, the structure of the composi-
tion and so forth before coming to a judgment. So while the judgment is almost
instinctive, it is different from instinct or intuition in two respects: (i) it is the prod-
uct of a learned ability, the outcome of prolonged study, and (ii) the judgment may
well comes about after reflection, and will be better when it does so.
I suggest that connoisseurship exemplifies the very same kinds of cognitive pro-
cess as Kuhn sees in science. In science the reflective process may be more involved,
but ultimately the nature of the judgment is the same, that the target (painting,
puzzle-solution) resembles the exemplars. It can be seen again in Kuhn’s parallel
with crossword puzzles. Sometimes an experienced solver of such puzzles will im-
mediately see a solution on reading the clue, but often the process will require some
thought before an answer reveals itself. That it is the correct answer will not be a
matter of a logical relation between it and the clue and puzzle (though spotting cer-
tain logical relations may be part of the reflective process) and the correctness of
the answer will not be readily apparent to someone who lacks experience with such
puzzles.
Since this is so far from the traditional epistemology of science and its search for
logical relations of confirmation, it is perhaps little surprise that, in Kuhn’s view, it
is the main source for the controversies and misunderstanding evoked by Structure,
and in particular the criticism that he is portraying science as a subjective and irra-
tional enterprise (1970: 175). Nonetheless, says Kuhn, the tacit knowledge embed-
ded in exemplars, ‘though [it is not], without essential change, subject to paraphrase
in terms of rules and criteria, it is nevertheless systematic, time tested, and in some
sense corrigible’.
The fact that we do spot similarities between family members, that art connois-
seurs do get to know almost instinctively who painted a newly discovered picture,
and so forth shows that there are indeed mechanisms of human cognition that meet
Kuhn’s description of those involved in science. Furthermore, artificial neural net-
works have been developed that embody learning with exemplars and have high
levels of success in cognitive tasks such as face and speech recognition, diagnosis in
medicine, spam filtering and so forth. So the question cannot be, ‘is such cognition
possible?’ or even ‘would science be irrational if it were to involve such cognition?’
For such cognition does exist and it would be bizarre to label high levels of success
(e.g. in recognising your children) are ‘irrational’. Rather, the important question is,
does science really involve such processes?
Let us look then, albeit briefly, at the evidence for a central role for Kuhnian pat-
tern recognition in scientific cognition. One piece of evidence is that already re-
ferred to by Kuhn in the quotation above. Exercises in textbooks are designed to
assist students to recognise certain puzzle situations as demanding solutions us-
ing certain equations or other techniques exemplified by worked examples in the
text. The first questions are straightforward, being most similar to those exemplars.
Later questions are increasingly difficult, principally by being less immediately sim-
ilar to the exemplars. Working through the questions will provide the student with a
trained sense of when a problem will call for a certain kind of solution or approach.
An experienced student or an expert will see immediately that a puzzle requires
these equations to be deployed in this way; a neophyte may know those equations
but not have any idea about how they are to be used in solving these puzzles. This,
plus the fact that skill in this regard is a matter of degree that is improved by repeated
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practice suggests that this is indeed an ability much like pattern recognition and not
a matter of deploying some general problem-solving capacity. Furthermore, experts
are able to see problems as exemplifying deeper physical patterns (e.g. as requiring
application of a certain principle, such as least action) while neophytes see only su-
perficial patterns (e.g. classifying puzzles by the kinds of entity involved) (Chi et al.
1981), conforming to Kuhn’s claim that training with exemplars induces new simi-
larity spaces. Howard Margolis (1987) makes an extended and persuasive case for
the centrality of pattern recognition in all judgment, including science, supported
by historical case studies.
Kuhn’s hypothesis concerning reasoning with paradigms sees scientific cogni-
tion as an instance of analogical reasoning. The scientist learns to sees an analogy
between her puzzle and the paradigm puzzle and so see how a solution to the lat-
ter might be transformed to provide a solution to the former. Analogical reasoning
of this sort is indeed ubiquitous in science, as is shown by close studies of scien-
tists using the approaches of psychology and anthropology (Holyoak and Thagard
1995, 1997; Dunbar 1996, 1999; Gentner et al. 2001) as well as historical research on
past episodes of scientific change (Margolis 1987; Gentner and Jeziorski 1993). Such
studies not only reveal that analogical reasoning is central to scientific thinking but
also shows that there are different kinds and depth of analogy that are deployed for
different purposes.
Of particular interest is the work done on Case-Based Reasoning (CBR). Accord-
ing to CBR, a case-based reasoner employs a stock of concrete cases; when a new
problem comes along, she compares the new case to the past stock. Analogies be-
tween the new cases and certain of the stock cases will prompt analogous solutions.
Some analogies may be stronger than others, making the corresponding analogical
solutions more plausible than the other possibilities. CBR has been of primary in-
terest to ‘knowledge engineers’, i.e. those building artificial intelligence systems to
solve certain kinds of problem, that fact that such models are efficacious in solving
scientific and other problems is indirect evidence for the Kuhnian thesis. Thomas
Nickles (2003) is, as far as I am aware, the first to make the connection between Kuh-
nian exemplars and CBR. Nickles does note aspects in which the two diverge. CBR
typically includes negative cases, i.e. cases where an analogy fails, which can often
be instructive, whereas Kuhn’s exemplars are all positive cases. Secondly, Kuhn does
not say enough about the historical development of exemplars. This is an important
point, for while Kuhn talks of Principia Mathematica as a paradigm, he also tells us
that students learn the paradigm through exemplars in textbooks and the exercises
whereby they learn to apply the exemplars and to see different puzzles as belong-
ing together. But the exemplars of classical mechanics found in textbooks are not
Newton’s exemplars in Principia. The exemplars have themselves undergone a pro-
cess of historical development, one, according to Nickles, whereby we do not just
fit new puzzles to old exemplars, but the exemplars themselves change in response
to the new puzzles. Nickles regards these divergences as exhibiting shortcomings
in Kuhn’s account. But the central significance of exemplars and the insight that
CBR may explain how they operate remain. Indeed, the naturalistic nature of Kuhn’s
claims, made before much of the current evidence became available, implies that
we should expect Kuhn’s picture to be modified as further evidence accrues.
The feature of CBR I wish to emphasize is one that is in fact ubiquitous in our
cognitive lives; it is the significance of cognitive habits. While Hume and others were
wrong in thinking that associationism (or classical conditioning) could explain ev-
erything about the way we think, it can nonetheless play a significant role in explain-
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ing many things. We become adept at playing a piece of music through exercise, so
that certain fingering that needed conscious thought initially is now performed with
unconscious fluency. The same can be true of intellectual activity also. Indeed Kuhn
likens the practice students get (SSR 47) in working through scientific exercises to
finger exercises. At first it will require hard thought and perhaps some trial and error
attempts to see how a particular theory should be applied to a new puzzle. In due
course the student will find that she has some facility in applying the theory to new
puzzles that may be of the same class as ones she has encountered before. It is only
a difference of degree for the great scientist, as Kuhn tells us:
Scientists model one problem solution on another, often with only a
minimal recourse to symbolic generalizations. Galileo found that ball
rolling down an inclined place acquires just enough velocity to return
to the same vertical height on a second incline of any slope, and he
learned to see that experimental situation as like the pendulum with a
point mass for a bob. (Kuhn 1974: 305)
Kuhn goes on to say that Huyghens’s solution to the problem of the centre of
gravity of physical pendulum is modelled on Galileo’s point pendulum, and then
that Bernoulli’s account of water-flow from an orifice in a storage tank resembles
Huyghens’s pendulum.
So the connection between a theory and a puzzle is one that starts out as ob-
scure and difficult to see but eventually becomes second nature. ‘Second nature’ is
so-called because it is, to its possessor, entirely naturally and intuitive, the reactions
are instinctive. On the other hand it is ‘second’—acquired, not innate. Such con-
nections I have called ‘quasi-intuitive connections’. Such connections cause us to
make inferences, e.g. that a certain puzzle-situation can be seen as a case of simple
harmonic motion. It is natural to use perceptual terms in such cases: as Kuhn says,
Galileo sees the ball on the inclined plane as like the pendulum: on seeing the ball
Galileo quasi-intuitively infers that what is true of the pendulum is true of the ball;
that analogy (second) naturally springs to his mind. In many such cases the nature
of the subject’s total experience is the effect, in part, of the learned associations, the
quasi-intuitive inferences the subject makes. Importantly, is this experience that the
subject reports as an observation, as data:
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, particularly chap.10, I repeat-
edly insist that members of different scientific communities live in dif-
ferent worlds and that scientific revolutions change the worlds in which
a scientist works. I would now want to say that members of different
communities are presented with different data by the same stimuli. No-
tice, however, that that change does not make phrases like “a different
world” inappropriate. The given world, whether everyday or scientific,
is not a world of stimuli. (Kuhn 1974: 309)
I have elsewhere argued that one way to understand Kuhn’s ‘worlds’ and ‘world-
changes’ is in terms of the shared quasi-intuitive connections of a scientific commu-
nity (Bird 2005). Certain quasi-intuitive connections, because instilled by training
with exemplars, are second nature to all members of the community. When exem-
plars change, these patterns of quasi-intuitive connections change: inferences that
were permitted before are not not permitted, and vice-versa. To take a simplified ex-
ample, an Aristotelian is permitted to infer from ‘x is in motion’, to ‘there is a cause
of x’s motion’, whereas the Newtonian is not permitted to make that inference; for
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a Newtonian, only the following is permitted ‘x has changed its motion (i.e. accel-
erated or decelerated)’ therefore ‘there is a cause of x’s change in motion’. This is
the same transition in quasi-intuitive connections that students have to make when
learning physics.
I also propose that such changes in patterns of quasi-intuitive connections can
also account for incommensurability (2007). When one author employs quasi-
intuitive connections that are not possessed by a reader, then it will be very difficult
for the reader to make sense of author’s reasoning. It will appear to be full of non-
sequiturs and so lacking in rationality. Deeper acquaintance with the author and
the author’s exemplars may eventually allow the reader to understand the tacit con-
nections the author is making and so be able to rationalise the author’s discussion.
I conjecture that something like this explains Kuhn’s experience on initially finding
Aristotle to be an incomprehensibly bad physicist then converted to appreciating his
genius, an experience that was formative in Kuhn’s approach to incommensurability
in Structure (1970: v; 1977: xi–xii; 1987: 8–9). I believe that this way of understanding
incommensurability can also help appreciate incommensurability between an old
paradigm and its replacement. Because the quasi-intuitive connections are deeply
ingrained in those practising in the old paradigm, it is difficult for them to appreciate
that they even employing those connections and to give them up. That will be most
true for those who have worked most extensively in the old paradigm, i.e. older sci-
entists and those working centrally, and explains why younger scientists and those
who come from outside the specialty are able to see possibilities that are in effect
ruled out by the quasi-intuitive connections.
The proposals I sketch above are in need of further empirical confirmation. Yet,
the fact that they rest upon a basis of extensive research in psychology, cognitive sin-
cere, and artificial intelligence, as well as history of science, lends them plausibility.
From the perspective of the remainder of this paper, the important feature to bear
in mind is that the central explanatory tool is: a set of cognitive habits learned by
training with exemplars. This contrasts with the centrality of conceptual structures
in the alternative approach to understanding Kuhn in relation to cognitive science
that I turn to now.
3 Dynamic frames
Some of those who believe that cognitive psychology can assist in illuminating the
problems with which Kuhn was grappling focus on conceptual change. Nancy Ners-
essian’s ‘cognitive-historical’ approach is a leading example (Nersessian 1987, 1992,
2003). Hanne Andersen, Peter Barker, and Xiang Chen have developed related ideas
in detail to produce a sophisticated account of conceptual change that draws upon
cognitive science and which vindicates what they take to be a Kuhnian approach
to incommensurability and scientific revolutions (Andersen et al. 1996, 2006; Chen
et al. 1998). While acknowledging the significance of these ideas, and accepting
that they may illuminate aspects of incommensurability, I am sceptical regarding
the central place given to specifically conceptual change. Because the approach of
Andersen, Barker, and Chen (henceforth ABC) is more exclusively conceptual, it is
on their work that I concentrate in this section.
According to ABC (2006: 5), ‘Between 1969 and 1994, Kuhn elaborated an ac-
count of scientific change in which the theory of concepts holds a central place.’
Andersen, Barker, and Chen (henceforth ABC) argue that Kuhn’s account built on
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ideas from Wittgenstein about concepts, in particular the family resemblance idea,
that he had introduced before this period. They say that these Wittgensteinian ideas
were ‘almost universally repudiated by philosophers in the English-speaking world’,
who preferred the classical definitional account of concepts. Nonetheless, the ap-
proach of Wittgenstein and Kuhn received empirical confirmation, first in the work
of Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch 1973; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch
1988).
The classical theory of concepts says that a concept is a structured entity, where
that structure consists of a set of conditions, individually necessary and jointly suffi-
cient for the correct application of the concept. While versions of the classical theory
can be traced back to Plato, and a more recent version to Locke, the classical view
was central to logical empiricism. Propositions are either synthetic or analytic. The
truth of the former is verified by empirical procedures. The truth of the latter is ver-
ified by decomposing the constituent concepts into their components, which are
the necessary and sufficient conditions for their correct application; a true analytic
proposition will be revealed to be a tautology. Since a large range of non-empirical
(but not nonsensical) propositions, including those of philosophy and mathemat-
ics, were held to be analytic, logical empiricism’s commitment to the classical view
of concepts is significant.
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy challenged the classical view. In particular, the
fact, as he insisted, that some concepts are family resemblance concepts appeared
to refute the idea that the correct application of a concept is determined by a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions. A number of entities might fall under a family
resemblance concept yet share no relevant property in common; so no (non-trivial)
property is individually necessary. What makes the entities fall under the concept
is the fact that those entities are related by a network of different resemblances, like
the resemblances between various members of a family.
According to ABC, the classical view, although dominant, came under pressure
not only from Wittgenstein’s alternative, later followed by Kuhn, but also from the
fact that successful analyses of concepts into necessary and sufficient conditions
were few: many crucial concepts (such as KNOWLEDGE) resisted formidable efforts
to analyse them. Most importantly, the classical view, it is alleged, is refuted by the
empirical work of Rosch and others in the 1970s.
This empirical work shows that concept users regard some instances of a con-
cept as more typical than others, even when the instances all fall under the con-
cept. For example a sparrow is held to be a more typical instance of BIRD than a
chicken. According to the classical view both sparrows and chickens satisfy the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions for BIRD; the concept makes no distinction between
them. Such typicality affects usually show a graded structure, a structure which is re-
vealed in certain kinds of performance, such as speed in categorising entities. These
empirical results led to the development of an alternative to the classical account of
concepts, the prototype view.
The prototype account of concepts is similar to the classical view in that it re-
gards concepts as structured, consisting of a list of features. However, these features
are not necessary features, features possessed by all instances of a concept. Rather
such features are weighted, reflecting the fact that items in the concept’s extension
tend to have these features. Such weights, which may be thought of in statistical
terms (possibly reflecting frequency in the extension), will allow there to be a re-
lation of similarity between the representation of some entity and the concept, a
relation that comes in degrees. So BIRD may include the feature list (or prototype)
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HAS WINGS, IS FEATHERED, LAYS EGGS, HAS A BEAK, SMALL, SINGS, FLIES, NESTS. The
weighting of these features means the following: sparrows are more similar to the
prototype than chickens, because there is some weighting attached to SMALL and
SINGS; both sparrows and chickens have sufficient similarity to the prototype to be
regarded as birds; while SMALL and SINGS do contribute to sparrows being classified
as birds their absence from chickens does not disqualify chickens from the category
(they are not necessary conditions).
The prototype account seems to allow for family resemblance concepts: features
can be relevant to classification without being necessary conditions; similarity is the
basis of classification, but not all instances of the concept are similar in the same
way. Rosch herself assimilated Wittgenstein’s view to the prototype theory she de-
veloped. ABC link both to Kuhn’s view of concepts. As mentioned, Kuhn does refer
to Wittgenstein’s family resemblance idea over a page and a half in Structure.2 ABC
draw on this and on Kuhn’s discussion in ‘Second thoughts on paradigms’ (Kuhn
1974), where Kuhn describes a parent teaching a child to distinguish ducks, geese,
and swans. Initially the child sees the differences between individual swans as just
as salient as the differences between swans and geese. The parent then trains the
child by pointing out which of the birds they encounter are ducks, geese, and swans,
and also by affirming or correcting the child’s own attempts at classification. Now
the child can group the animals correctly, and thereby gets to know what ‘duck’,
‘goose’, and ‘swan’ mean. ABC point out that Kuhn generalizes this to other scien-
tific concepts. It is by learning the similarities between different applications of the
law sketch F=ma to concrete problem situations that a student . ‘A conceptual struc-
ture,’ they say, ‘is established by grouping problem situations into similarity classes
corresponding to the various expressions of the law sketch’ (Andersen et al. 1996:
31).
ABC go beyond the prototype theory to a development from the same set of
ideas, Lawrence Barsalou’s dynamic frame account. The frame account in effect
adds structure to the prototype theory. As with the prototype theory we identify a
concept with various features, which we do as follows. A superordinate concept is
associated with several attributes, for example BIRD with BEAK, NECK, COLOUR, SIZE,
and GAIT. Each attribute may take one of a number of values, e.g. BEAK may take
the values ROUND or POINTED and FOOT may take the values WEBBED or CLAWED. A
particular subordinate concept is identified with specific values of these attributes:
WATER BIRD has the values ROUND for BEAK, WEBBED for FOOT while LAND BIRD has
the values POINTED for BEAK and CLAWED for FOOT. An important property of Barsa-
lou’s frames is that there can be connections between components of the structure.
For example, one might note that there is a correlation between beak shape and foot
type: birds with webbed feet have round bills and birds with claws have pointed
beaks. Such correlations are part of the conceptual structure. ABC (2006: 209) make
it clear that in their view (and in Kuhn’s view) ‘there is no distinction between defin-
ing and contingent features of an object’, so all beliefs about a kind of object are
represented by some aspect of the conceptual structure, including such such con-
nections (constraints).
As indicated with the example of the superordinate concept BIRD and the sub-
ordinate concepts WATER BIRD and LAND BIRD, we can use the frame account to un-
derstand taxonomic hierarchies. Such hierarchies are governed by three principles:
the no-overlap principle: distinct concepts do no partially overlap (either they do not
2Below I shall argue that Kuhn’s reference to Wittgenstein is incidental, not central to Structure.
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overlap at all or one concept is subordinate to the other); the exhaustion principle:
when a superordinate concept has subordinate concepts, every entity falling un-
der the superordinate concept falls under some subordinate concept (nothing is left
unclassified by the subordinate concepts; the inclusion principle: everything falling
under a subordinate concept falls under its superordinate concept.
ABC use the dynamic frame account of concepts to articulate and develop key
Kuhnian ideas: anomaly, revolution, and incommensurability. An anomaly occurs
when an entity (often a thing but may be an event) is discovered whose classification
demands violation of some hierarchical principle. (Because the structures governed
by those principles embody our expectations about what there is and what it is like,
such entities are unexpected and may be difficult to recognise as such.) For example,
the South American screamer has webbed feet and a pointed beak. So, on the basis
of its beak it seems to require classification under LAND BIRD whereas its webbed feet
would propose classification user WATER BIRD. However, to classify the screamer as
both LAND BIRD and WATER BIRD would be to violate the no-overlap principle.
If such anomalies are to be accommodated (rather than simply excluded), then
the conceptual structure needs to be reformed. As ABC explain, further attributes
of BIRD, such as PLUMAGE and TARSUS become relevant so that there can be three
exhaustive but mutually exclusive subordinate concepts NATATORES, GRALLATORES,
and GALLINAE, where there were previously only two (LAND BIRD and WATER BIRD).
Such revisions of the conceptual structure, where existing entities are redistributed
in ways that were forbidden by the previous taxonomy, are definitive of scientific
revolutions, which ABC go on the illustrate with more sophisticated examples, such
as nuclear physics in the 1930s and the development of the Copernican revolution.
ABC point out that this approach allows for revolutions that differ in scale.
Revolutionary changes to taxonomic conceptual structures will involve changes
to the similarity and difference relationships that define our categories. For exam-
ple, in the BIRD case, the basis on which similarity and difference between birds
has changed; in particular new attributes have been added that contribute to de-
termining the similarity space that were previously irrelevant (e.g. PLUMAGE). Such
changes explain incommensurability. ABC argue that incommensurability does not
automatically imply communication failure and use the frame approach to describe
different kinds of conceptual change and their consequences.
4 Discussion
ABC have done an important and useful service in articulating a framework for un-
derstanding Kuhn’s later, taxonomic, account of incommensurability (Kuhn 1987,
1991, 1993. C.f. Sankey 1998). And if Barsalou’s account of concepts is largely cor-
rect for at least some concepts, then they have also provided an insight into how—in
some scientific cases—there can be incommensurability and thereby shed light on
the nature of some scientific revolutions, those in which a revolutionary change is
centred on a radical rearrangement of taxonomic structure. In this section I will ar-
gue that we should see ABC’s approach, insightful though it is, as restricted in scope,
both as an articulation of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, and as an account
of the phenomena of scientific revolutions.
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4.1 Understanding the historical context
ABC overstate the case for the dominance of the classical account of concepts
among English-speaking philosophers, and for Kuhn’s being special in rejecting it
for an account along Wittgensteinian lines. Views of concepts inconsistent with the
classical account were widely discussed, for example W. B. Gallie’s (1955) idea of an
essentially contested concept, Dummett’s (1991) proof-theoretic semantics, Quine’s
meaning nihilism (1951; 1960), Schlick’s (1918) notion of implicit definition, devel-
oping ideas from Hilbert, the holism of the double-language model of Carnap (1956)
and Nagel (1961), and finally the New Theory of Reference (Marcus 1961; Kripke
1971, 1980), probably the dominant current view. Many philosophers articulated
Wittgenstein-inspired approaches to concepts, in many case using Waismann’s idea
of open-texture, for example Hart (1961) in philosophy of law, MacIntyre (1973)
in social philosophy, Weitz (1956) and Mandelbaum (1965) in aesthetics, and von
Wright (1963) in ethics.
Against such a background, Kuhn’s brief discussion of Wittgenstein does not
stand out. Many philosophers had a rather deeper engagement with Wittgen-
steinian ideas, which were widely discussed. And as I shall go on to argue, the latter
were not especially important for Kuhn.
At the same time, other views of meaning and of concepts were developed that
challenged the classical view. So even if ABC were correct that what they hold to be a
Wittgenstein–Kuhn account of concepts is superior to the classical view, that would
not show that the former is our best theory. For there are alternatives out there;
and in particular, I suggest, accounts of concepts need to be taken seriously that
are consistent with the New Theory of Reference—accounts such as atomism that
contradict both the classical account and the alleged Wittgenstein–Kuhn account.
4.2 Understanding Kuhn’s theory
ABC tell us, ‘We will show that all of the important features of Kuhn’s model may now
be seen as consequences of this fundamental account of human concepts and its
dynamics’; ‘We will elaborate the notion of incommensurability, the central theme
of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions’ (ABC 1998, 6).
Because incommensurability was so contentious and because Kuhn spent so
great a proportion of his later work in adjusting and refining his account of incom-
mensurability, it is easy to gain an exaggerated picture of its significance in Struc-
ture. As I mentioned above, Kuhn uses the terms ‘incommensurable’ and ‘incom-
mensurability’ only nine times in the first edition of Structure, which contrasts with
the hundreds of uses of ‘paradigm’. Incommensurability simply is not ‘the central
theme of Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions’ as that theory is articulated in its
locus classicus.
Nor is Kuhn’s use of ideas from Wittgenstein in Structure central to that theory.
Kuhn completed a draft of Structure around April 1961, i.e. only a few months before
completion of the final version as published in 1962 (Hoyningen-Huene 2006). The
principal difference between this draft, now known as Proto-Structure, and Struc-
ture is that the latter has a chapter, ‘The Priority of Paradigms’, that Proto-Structure
lacks. Furthermore, the preceding chapter of Structure, entitled ‘Normal Science
as Puzzle-solving’ exists in Proto-Structure as a chapter entitled ‘Normal Science as
Rule-Determined.’ What we may infer from these facts is that the material in ‘The
Priority of Paradigms’ is not essential to the basic ideas of Kuhn’s theory of scientific
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revolutions, all of which is in place in Proto-Structure. The brief passage concerning
Wittgenstein is in this late additional chapter. And so Wittgenstein-inspired ways of
thinking cannot be central to Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions, contrary to the
thrust of ABC’s argument.3 We may also infer that Kuhn’s thinking about rules must
have undergone some change after completing Proto-Structure. It is possible that
Kuhn showed Proto-Structure to his colleague Stanley Cavell, who pointed him in
the direction of Wittgenstein as someone who had something relevant to say about
rules, and that Kuhn revised his opinion in response to reading Wittgenstein. Alter-
natively, Kuhn independently was rethinking the nature and significance of rules,
and reading Wittgenstein, again probably at the prompting of Cavell, helped him
articulate his new ideas. 4
Either way, what is important is that the newly added reference to Wittgenstein
does not come at a point where Kuhn is dealing with concepts but in a chapter where
he is concerned with the more general phenomenon of rules and how they relate
to working within a paradigm. ‘Normal Science as Puzzle-solving’ emphasises the
analogy between normal science and puzzle-solving, and a central part of that argu-
ment involves showing that like games (including games of puzzle-solving), normal
science is played according to rules (as the title of this chapter’s original in Proto-
Structure emphasizes). But in ‘The Priority of Paradigms’ Kuhn accepts that this
cannot be all there is to working within a paradigm. He points out that a historian
seeking the shared rules of a scientific tradition will meet with partial success but
also frustration. That is because there can be agreement on what the exemplars are
without any explicit, shared articulation of what specific features of those exemplars
explain their continued success. But then there is a puzzle about how there can be
this agreement without there being a full set of rules that the community are agreed
on following. It is in this context that Kuhn includes a footnote to Polanyi’s notion
of tacit knowledge, for part of the answer is that the agreement is tacit, and not ar-
ticulated explicitly. Still, that would leave unanswered the question of how this tacit
knowledge and tacit agreement come about. The passage on Wittgenstein comes
next, for it does answer that question. One might think that the application of con-
cepts is governed by explicit rules, and while that may be true up to a point, Wittgen-
stein’s argument surrounding family resemblance concepts shows that this cannot
be the whole story. As Kuhn (1970: 45) says, ‘For Wittgenstein, in short, games, and
chairs, and leaves are natural families, each constituted by a network of overlapping
and crisscross resemblances.’ It is the importance of learning to spot resemblances
that Kuhn identifies here and which replaces the explicit following of rules. This he
exploits in the next paragraph when he returns to science:
Something of the same sort may very well hold for the various research
problems and techniques that arise within a single normal-scientific
tradition. What these have in common is not that they satisfy some ex-
3ABC (2006: 105) mention Wittgenstein’s use of the duck-rabbit and say that Kuhn took over Wittgen-
stein’s examples. But this seems unlikely, since Kuhn mentions the duck-rabbit in Proto-Structure and so
before he saw the relevance of Wittgenstein’s work. The duck-rabbit, first used in psychology by Jastrow
(1899), has appeared in psychology textbooks since 1922. It is more probable therefore that Kuhn’s exam-
ples came from his own interest in Gestalt psychology (which Wittgenstein also had), which, as ABC do
note, precedes his acquaintance with the work of Wittgenstein.
4It should be noted that there is another tradition in Kuhn scholarship that sees a strong influence
by Wittgenstein on Kuhn, for example Kindi (1995a,b); Sharrock and Read (2002); Narboux (2003). Read
(2005) rejects the naturalistic approach that is common ground to those discussed in this paper; indeed
he regards the use of cognitive science by Nersessian and ABC as un-Wittgensteinian, despite their refer-
ences to Wittgenstein. In my view both groups exaggerate the significance of Wittgenstein for Kuhn.
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plicit or even some fully discoverable set of rules and assumptions that
gives the tradition its character and its hold upon the scientific mind.
Instead, they may relate by resemblance and by modeling to one or an-
other part of the scientific corpus which the community in question al-
ready recognizes as among its established achievements.
As this context shows Kuhn is not interested here in articulating a theory of concepts.
Rather he is articulating a theory of how learning to recognise resemblances can
replace the explicit following of rules. Wittgenstein’s point of about concepts is an
analogue to Kuhn’s point about working with exemplars, albeit one underpinned by
the same cognitive ability in recognising patterns of resemblances.
The conclusion of the preceding paragraphs is this. The reference to Wittgen-
stein in Structure is not central to this theory of scientific revolutions; it is a late
addition to that theory. And Kuhn’s purpose in talking about Wittgenstein is not to
articulate a theory of concepts; it is to show how recognition of resemblances can re-
place explicit following of rules; and the purpose of that is to give a more satisfactory
account of what is involved in working in a paradigm. Furthermore, the reference to
Wittgenstein comes nowhere near Kuhn’s discussion of incommensurability, which
does not make an appearance for another hundred pages. Consequently, we should
not think that because Kuhn refers to Wittgenstein in Structure that he is there be-
ginning to develop a Wittgenstein-inspired theory of concepts that is central to his
theory of scientific revolutions.
Because it concerns Structure, published in 1962, what I have said so far in this
section is consistent ABC’s key claim that the theory of concepts is central to Kuhn’s
account of scientific change elaborated between 1969 and 1994. If they are right,
then Kuhn developed a second account of scientific change, substantially different
from the in Structure. Kuhn does write ‘Violation or distortion of a previously un-
problematic scientific language is the touchstone for revolutionary change’ (1987:
21) in his paper ‘What are scientific revolutions?’, written in 1981. And he does in-
deed develop a novel account of incommensurability, one based on taxonomic vi-
olation, elements of which are found in ‘What are scientific revolutions?’ Nonethe-
less, the textual evidence for a new theory of scientific change is thin. ‘What are
scientific revolutions?’ is mostly taken up with descriptions of three episodes of rev-
olutionary change, followed by only three pages of discussion. The latter picks out
three common features: (i) the changes are locally holistic: several scientific com-
mitments (theoretical claims, etc.) are changed together, where it would make no
sense to make the changes piecemeal; (ii) there are changes to the taxonomic cat-
egories involved; and (iii) ‘a central change of model, metaphor, or analogy’, which
Kuhn thinks is ‘probably the most consequential’ of the characteristics (1987: 20).
While the centrality of of taxonomic change is certainly new, Kuhn says too little,
here or elsewhere, to attribute to him a new account of scientific change. At most
what we get is a change in what he takes to constitute a scientific revolution. But
that leaves untouched the dynamics of scientific revolutions (why they occur, what
happens when they occur, and how they are resolved).
Another question for ABC’s thesis concerns the timing of the claimed shift in
Kuhn’s thinking about scientific change. They date is back to 1969, when Kuhn wrote
the Postscipt to the second edition of Structure. While this does show important
new ideas and emphases, Kuhn is clearly most concerned to clarify and elaborate
the central ideas of Structure, those concerning paradigms, exemplars in particular.
Crucially, the period they refer to includes Kuhn’s ‘Second thoughts on paradigms’
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(1974), which is central to their case that Kuhn held a Wittgenstein-inspired account
of concepts—yet Kuhn does not mention Wittgenstein at all in ‘Second thoughts’.
Pace ABC, in ‘Second thoughts on paradigms’ Kuhn does not expound a theory
of concepts (he doesn’t use the term ‘concept’ and only sparsely talks about ‘mean-
ing’). Rather, he is principally concerned to further articulate his notion of exemplar
as paradigm (as the title hints) and to argue that exemplars can function without
rules. In particular we do not apply exemplars and their symbolic generalisations to
the world by obeying correspondence rules (as the logical positivists would have);
rather we do so in virtue of having learned similarities between the exemplary puz-
zle situation and the puzzles we are confronted with (as discussed in section 2). If the
correspondence rule approach were right, then such a rule might say something like,
‘apply Ohm’s law to situations with features F in such-and-such a way’, implying that
we would have some prior grasp on what F is. In denying the work supposedly done
by correspondence rules, Kuhn denies that we are able to group puzzle-situations
by their being F. So how do we know when to apply Ohm’s law? Kuhn (1974: 308)
therefore says, ‘I now want to argue, there is a means of processing data into sim-
ilarity sets which does not depend on a prior answer to the question, similar with
respect to what?’ But he does not want to deploy scientific examples because ‘in-
evitably the latter prove excessively complex’ (1974: 309).5 That is why he uses the
story of Johnny learning to differentiate ducks, swans, and geese, because that is a
process whereby someone learns to group entities (in story: wildfowl; in science:
scientific problems) into classes of similar entities (in story: e.g. ducks; in science:
e.g. problems requiring application of Ohm’s law).6 So although Kuhn’s discussion in
‘Second thoughts on paradigms’ provides fuel for a theory of concepts, developing
such a theory is not Kuhn’s focus, which he himself tells us is the wider question of
the operation of paradigms (understood as exemplars) and their dependence on the
process of learning to apprehend similarities by training (rather than rules). ABC’s
primary source for what they call ‘Kuhn’s theory of concepts’ is not intended to be
any such thing (just as Kuhn’s reference to Wittgenstein is not intended to articulate
a view about meaning).7
In summary, Kuhn was not concerned to develop a theory of concepts in Struc-
ture; his mention of Wittgenstein there is not central to his argument and is not con-
cerned with promoting a Wittgensteinian view of meaning. And since the theory
of concepts does not play a central role in his exposition of the theory of scientific
revolutions in Structure it is implausible, in my view, that more advanced theories of
concepts provided by cognitive science will illuminate or add to what Kuhn intended
in that theory. So ABC’s argument depends on there being a later theory of scientific
change, that does have a theory of concepts at its core. Yet the evidence that Kuhn
developed such a theory is thin. There is no new theory in the Postcript 1969 to the
5ABC state that this refers to the learning of concepts. But it is clear from the context provided by
the preceding three paragraphs that Kuhn (1974: 308) is primarily concerned with ‘learning to see two
problems as similar’ (my emphasis).
6Note reference above to Chi et al. (1981) and their work in showing how expertise causes changes in
which scientific problems are held to be similar.
7It is also worth noting that Johnny’s learning to differentiate waterfowl by creating a mental space of
similarities and dissimilarities does not mean that Johnny’s concepts DUCK, SWAN and GOOSE are family
resemblance concepts, since nothing in the story suggests that the concepts are constituted by criss-
crossing resemblances such that no single resemblance is shared by all of one kind. Not all resemblance is
family resemblance. The conjecture that Kuhn recognised that fact would explain why he did not refer to
Wittgenstein in his discussion. If, as ABC claim, this discussion is a development of his theory of concepts
based on the earlier adoption of Wittgenstein’s family-resemblance in Structure, then that omission is
surprising.
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second edition of Structure, nor is there in ‘Second thoughts on paradigms’ (1974).
ABC interpret the latter as proposing a view of concepts, but closer examination
does not support that view. It is true that Kuhn does later develop his ideas con-
cerning incommensurability, and in particular the taxonomic account (1987; 1991;
1993). I fully agree that ABC’s approach is a very productive way of developing Kuhn’s
thoughts in this respect (although I think there are limitations both to the dynamic
frame account of concepts and to the taxonomic account of incommensurability).
Does the development of that account amount also to a new, revised theory of sci-
entific change? I have argued that the evidence is thin. In any case, as I shall go on
to argue, insofar as Kuhn did reconceive revolutions as a certain kind of taxonomic
change, the result is an unsatisfactory account of scientific change.
4.3 Understanding scientific revolutions
Irrespective of whether we can develop Kuhn’s theory within a framework taken
from Rosch and Barsalou, is it in fact the case that their theories can tell us some-
thing about the phenomena of scientific revolution and incommensurability? Here
I argue that there are potentially significant limitations to the scope of the applica-
tion of those theories. First, we must recognise that there are important objections
to those theories that mean that at best they offer only a partial account of concepts.
(I shall concentrate on the prototype account, since this is the core of the approach
that ABC adopt.)
The empirical results of the work of Eleanor Rosch are widely (but not univer-
sally) agreed to be inconsistent with the classical theory, and so are taken by ABC
to support what they regard as the Wittgenstein–Kuhn approach and subsequent
developments by Barsalou and others. In the light of the preceding paragraphs we
should be wary in inferring from the falsity of the classical theory to the correctness
of the ‘Wittgenstein–Kuhn approach’—there are other competitors to be considered.
Indeed Laurence and Margolis (1999) list five competing types of theories of con-
cepts: the classical theory, the prototype theory, the neo-classical theory, the theory
theory, and atomism. All have their problems and all have things to be said in their
favour.
It is worth being aware of some of the limitations of the prototype theory:
• The problem of compositionality. Compound concepts are composed of their
component concepts. But the prototype of PET FISH is a small, gold animal
that lives in a bowl or tank. This cannot be composed from the prototypes for
PET (furry, mammalian) and FISH (brown, medium sized, lives in the sea).
• Conceptual ignorance. A subject may have distinct concepts RUTHENIUM and
RHODIUM yet be sufficiently ignorant that he has no knowledge that distin-
guishes ruthenium from rhodium. His prototypes for the two concepts are
identical. So the concepts ought to be identical too, according to the proto-
type theory.
• The problem of irrelevant detail. Prototypes may include features that are not
part of the concept. Fernando Torres is the prototype of a footballer. But FER-
NANDO TORRES is not part of the concept FOOTBALLER. If it were, then the con-
cept FOOTBALLER would change as older footballers retire and younger foot-
ballers become famous.
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• Psychological essentialism. Experimental evidence suggests that we use some
concepts as if we are essentialists, thinking that the correct application of
some concept is governed by some factor of which we may be unaware.
A natural conclusion to draw from these objections is that prototypicality structures
are not constitutive of concepts. The very same evidence supports equally that claim
that prototypicality structures are associated with concepts but not constitutive of
them, and that concepts get their identity via some other mechanism. For example
RUTHENIUM and RHODIUM get their identities by being hooked up to the world in
different ways. If I learn more about RUTHENIUM, so that I now have a richer proto-
typicality structure, that is not a matter of acquiring a new concept but of associating
new facts/beliefs to my pre-existing concept. The prototype theorist looks forced to
accept something like this for PET FISH; the same is no less true of PET and FISH also.
The graded structure revealed by experiments may best be understood not as reveal-
ing the facts about our concept but rather facts about the epistemology of applying
those concepts. For example, we may use prototypes in the application of concepts,
but those prototypes are just heuristic devices to enable faster processing.
It is a largely empirical matter whether the prototype theory can overcome such
objections, and whether they also present insurmountable problems for the dy-
namic frames account. Even if we accept the broad approach defined by those the-
ories, do such theories in fact help us understand what goes on in scientific revo-
lutions? Is it the case, as ABC (1998: 18) declare, that ‘revisions in taxonomy . . . are
now the distinguishing feature of revolutions’. Are anomalies cases that cause ten-
sion in an existing conceptual structure since they violate hierarchical principles
or demand divergent categorizations (1998: 7; 2006: 69–72)? I suggest that these
claims are mistaken. Scientific revolutions are frequently accompanied by concep-
tual changes, and in some cases conceptual change may be central to the nature
of the revolution. But in some cases there is no significant conceptual change, and
even in the cases where there is conceptual change, that change is typically not all
that there is to the scientific revolution. The principal reason for these claims is sim-
ple. Core to most science is belief. And in many cases to understand fully what hap-
pens in a revolution requires appreciation how beliefs changed. And not all belief
change, even significant belief change, is conceptual change.
It is simple to find anomalies in the history of science that do not satisfy ABC’s
description of them as violations of hierarchical principles, and which do not create
pressure for categorisation of things or phenomena in diverse ways. Here are some
examples:
• Anomalous planetary orbits. While Newton had been able to show that prin-
cipal ‘inequalities’ in the motion of the Moon were due to the gravitational at-
traction of the Sun, nonetheless Newton’s successors were unable to eliminate
a significant discrepancy between the predictions of the theory and what was
observed. In the 1740s the discrepancy was held by some to be an anomaly
requiring possible adjustment to Newton’s inverse square law (with further
terms). The anomaly violates no principle of categorisation; it is a simple
mismatch between what the theory demanded and what was observed. As it
was, Clairaut was ultimately able to resolve the anomaly by correcting certain
empirical approximations. But had the inverse square law required chang-
ing, that would not have been a change in taxonomy. Much the same can be
said about the anomalous precession of the perihelion of Mercury. While the
revolutionary general theory of relativity did involve conceptual revision, the
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anomaly in the orbit of Mercury did not itself imply any tension on categori-
sation or pose any threat to hierarchical principles.
• Anomalies in classical physics. (i) The ultraviolet (Rayleigh–Jeans) catastro-
phe. Classical physics predicts that a black-body in equilibrium will emit an
infinite quantity of energy in any finite time. Clearly it does not. (ii) Models
of the atom. The results of the Geiger–Marsden experiment were anomalous
in the light of the then current ‘plum-pudding’ model of the atom (Thomson).
Rutherford, following a suggestion of Nagaoka, proposed a concentration of
positive charge in what we call the nucleus, with electrons forming a cloud.
While resolving the preceding anomaly, because the nucleus is able to repel
the alpha particle, this model created its own anomaly. For the electrons to re-
main at a distance from the nucleus they must be moving (like planets around
the sun), but their motion would lead to loss of energy as electromagnetic ra-
diation, leading them to spiral into the nucleus. Yet atoms are clearly stable.
Both the latter anomaly and the ultraviolet catastrophe were resolved by the
development of the quantum theory, which indeed involved important con-
ceptual change. But as above, the anomalies themselves do not breach hierar-
chical principles or suggest divergent categorisations.
• Anomalies in Galen. Galen’s human anatomy, much of which had been based
on dissections of apes, came under critical scrutiny in the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries. Vesalius showed that many of Galen’s assertions are not
born out by observations of the human body. For example, Galen claimed that
there is a porous interventricular septum, so that blood could pass from the
right ventricle of the heart to the left (as his model required). Vesalius’s dissec-
tions published in the second edition of De Humani Corporis Fabrica showed
this to be false. This was not only a mistake in Galen’s work, but was anoma-
lous for his theory of the movement of the blood. Perhaps the best known
anomaly for that theory is that expounded by Harvey, who in chapter eight of
De Motu Cordis estimated that quantity of blood pumped by the heart (about
250kg in a day). Galen’s theory held that (venous) blood was produced by the
liver and absorbed elsewhere in the body. But clearly it would be impossible
for the liver to produce this quantity of new blood. The anomalies are signifi-
cant for Galen’s theory. But they are once again straightforward to understand:
the dominant theory held or implied p; observation show that p is false.
Such cases show that anomalies are not always cases that violate hierarchical prin-
ciples; often they are simple (though significant) disagreements between theory and
observation—in the physical sciences such disagreements may be simple quantita-
tive and so no question of taxonomy could possibly be raised.
Even if I am right about anomalies, it might nonetheless be the case that any
resulting revolution is a significant change in taxonomy. Many examples, however,
show that there are revolutions that do not result in significant taxonomic change.
One significant problem with the ABC view is presented by science of which taxon-
omy is not a significant element.
• Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity undoubtedly made revolu-
tionary contributions to physics, yet the physics in question is not concerned
with taxonomy. No doubt one can construct taxonomies that would be af-
fected by these changes. So the relativity of simultaneity disrupts a taxonomy
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of events that is available under classical assumptions (e.g. ‘past’, ‘present’,
‘future’). But such taxonomies are not central to the Einsteinian revolutions
and to attempt to characterize the revolutions in terms of taxonomic change
would be to miss the key innovations of Einstein’s theories.
Kuhn (1970: 101–2) does argue that there is conceptual change in general relativity
(concerning the terms ‘space’, ‘time’, and ‘mass’). But these are not taxonomic terms.
ABC’s claim that revolutionary change is taxonomic change is the consequence of
two assertions, that revolutionary change is conceptual change and that conceptual
change is taxonomic change, which imposes a double straight-jacket on revolutions.
Even sciences with taxonomies can undergo revolutions that do not involve sig-
nificant conceptual change and without disrupting taxonomic structures. Here are
some examples:
• The discovery of the structure of DNA. One of the most far-reaching scientific
discoveries of all time, Crick and Watson’s elucidation of the structure of DNA
must count as revolutionary in that it transformed biology and biochemistry
and gave rise to several new scientific fields (such as molecular genetics). In
so doing the discovery led to the addition of new taxonomic categories and
indeed new taxonomies structures. Yet it did not require any radical changes
to existing structures. The taxonomic effects are cumulative rather than revi-
sionary.
• The cause of stomach ulcers. The standard view was that the principal cause
of gastric ulcers is excess stomach acid, which could be brought about by fac-
tors such as stress. Barry Marshall and Robin Warren showed that 90% of such
ulcers are caused by the bacterium H. pylori. This was a revolutionary change.
It overturned a theory that had held sway for decades and which underpinned
a raft of clinical procedures and commercial activities, including psychoana-
lytic therapies, surgery, and a multi-billion dollar pharmaceutical industry. It
was fiercely resisted for some time, but is now the accepted view, with cor-
responding changes in scientific and clinical practice. In this case there is
a change in classification. We might have a classification of diseases by pri-
mary cause, and peptic ulcers (gastric and duodenal ulcers) have moved from
‘stress-induced’ to ‘bacterial infection’. That change is not a change in taxo-
nomic structure, just a change in where one places an item in an unchanged
structure. Hence ABC’s theory cannot account for it as a revolutionary change.
• The function of the heart. Harvey’s response to the anomalies in Galen’s ac-
count of the heart and blood was to provide a new theory of their function
and motion: blood circulates, pumped by he heart. This is a radical departure
from Galen’s teaching and is righty regarded as one of the most important rev-
olutionary discoveries in physiology, notwithstanding the fact that there are
many continuities between Harvey’s thinking and the preceding era. Harvey’s
work had profound influence on subsequent physiology. For example, given
that Harvey had shown that the liver does not create blood, then it is natural to
ask what then is the function of the liver, thereby stimulating novel (and also
revolutionary) work by Batholin and others on the liver and lymphatic sys-
tem. Furthermore, Harvey’s work was pioneering in terms of technique, as an
exemplar of experimental physiology. It is difficult to see how this revolution
can be characterised as a change in taxonomic structure.
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• The discovery of nuclear structure. The two decades from 1909 saw a radical
transformation in our understanding of the structure of the atom and in par-
ticular of the nucleus, with much of the work directed or inspired by Ernest
Rutherford. As discussed above, the Geiger–Marsden experiment led to the
development of the Rutherford–Bohr model of the atom, with positive charge
concentrated in a ‘nucleus’. Bohr’s version of model end experimental work by
Moseley implied a relationship between atomic number and nuclear charge,
which in turn suggested that there are discrete entities each with unit positive
charge, experimentally confirmed by Rutherford’s ‘splitting the atom’ exper-
iment. Yet this raised the question, how could discrete like charges be held
together against their mutually repulsive forces, which led to the hypothesis
of further, uncharged nuclear particles and the discovery of the neutron by
Chadwick in 1932. This sequence of discoveries led to the science of nuclear
physics, some important aspects of which are described in detail by ABC. Like
the discovery of the structure of DNA, a principal contribution of this revo-
lution is that is opens up a while new field of science, providing a paradigm
of how that science is to be carried out. As as in the case of Harvey, the rev-
olution involved and promoted the development of new experimental tech-
niques, for example the use of high-energy particles to probe the structure of
matter that became exemplars of experimental methods that have developed
to the present day.
In most of these cases the revolutions are best understood as changes in what is
believed, whose significance is generated by the theoretical and experimental con-
text in which they occur. In addition others involve revolutionary changes in ex-
perimental technique. Kuhn explains, for example, how the discovery of X-rays was
revolutionary because it potentially called into question the use of cathode ray tubes
and the results produced by them, while also opening up a new field. The develop-
ment of staining techniques in cytology and statistical tests in social research are
further examples. Many cases in the history of science will exhibit theoretical and
experimental change. In both kinds of case, new paradigms are generated: new ex-
emplars of scientific thinking and doing. In these cases, I have argued, changes in
conceptual structure are not significant in understanding what is going on. Some
cases involved additions to conceptual structure, but for ABC such additions are not
revolutionary changes, for the latter require disruption to conceptual structure. In
other cases there may be some such disruption: arguably the concept of CHEMICAL
ELEMENT went through a disruptive change as a result of the changes in understand-
ing of atomic structure. Maybe with a little ingenuity one could make a case for some
kind of conceptual change in all these cases. But any such changes would be tan-
gential to the cognitive changes that science and scientists underwent. Since ABC
make a general claim about the nature of scientific revolutions (as being a matter
of taxonomic change), such cases serve to refute their thesis. Refuting their general
thesis does not require asserting that the sort of conceptual change they describe
is never central to a scientific revolution. Sometimes it may well be, and the cases
they describe are excellent candidates. The conclusion we should draw from their
cases is not that all revolutions involve such change but only that some revolutions
involve such changes. We may add to the kinds of revolutionary changes in science
mentioned in the first two sentences of this paragraph: depending on the scien-
tific context (theoretical, technical, conceptual), a scientific revolution might be a
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significant change to what is believed, to experimental technique, or to conceptual
structure. In each case the revolution will create new exemplars.
I shall now turn to incommensurability, albeit briefly, for my conclusions con-
cerning incommensurability are corollaries of what has been said above. ABC (1998:
6) tell us that ‘the notion of incommensurability [is] the central theme of Kuhn’s
theory of scientific revolutions’. Incommensurability does not play a major role in
Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions as found in Structure (furthermore, the in-
commensurability there is methodological as well as conceptual). Kuhn does give
incommensurability a central role in his later work. But since he did not under-
take a concerted revision of his theory of scientific revolutions, it cannot be said
that incommensurability becomes the central theme of that theory, whose princi-
pal source remains Structure. Secondly, the examples given above of revolutionary
changes in science without taxonomic shifts are a fortiori examples of revolutionary
change without taxonomic incommensurability. We noted that Kuhn himself argues
that there is conceptual change and incommensurability in the Einsteinian case. If
Kuhn is correct about that, then it isn’t taxonomic incommensurability. Yet, for ABC,
incommensurability is taxonomic incommensurability.
If we start not from a theory of incommensurability, but from the phenomenon
of incommensurability, matters look different. In Structure, we identify incommen-
surability by its symptoms, such as a sense that the world has changed, something
like a Gestalt switch, when what seemed incoherent now makes sense. We can see
how such phenomena did occur in some of these cases. For example, Barry Mar-
shall’s wife reports overhearing comments at a gastroenterology conference in the
United States, ‘They were talking about this terrible person that they imported from
Australia to speak. You know: “How could they put such rubbish in the conference?”’
(Schulz 2010). Despite the fact that bacterial infections are so common and the fact
that no-one had any direct evidence against Marshall’s theory, it was branded as
rubbish. In part because physicians believed that stomachs were too acidic for bac-
teria (though bacteriologists knew better) and in large part because a totally differ-
ent theory (the stress theory) had held sway for so long and had informed every
aspect of their thinking and practice, it was difficult for them to see that such a rad-
ical alternative could be scientifically respectable. This, I suggest, is an important
phenomenon in understanding scientific change, but it is one not one captured by
thinking in terms of conceptual change. It is nonetheless, I suggest, one that can be
readily understood in terms of cognitive habits.
5 Conclusion
ABC make bold claims about their approach to scientific revolutions and incom-
mensurability. They elaborate Barsalou’s dynamic frame account of concepts and
assert ‘We will show that all of the important features of Kuhn’s model [of scientific
revolutions] may now be seen as consequences of this fundamental account of hu-
man concepts and its dynamics’ (1998: 6). I think this is badly mistaken. For a start,
we should be alive to problems with ABC’s preferred approach to concepts and the
fact that it has competitors. Be that as it may, does such a theory provide us with a
way of capturing Kuhn’s theory of scientific change? No, because conceptual change
is not central to his theory as articulated in Structure; incommensurability is not a
central theme of Structure. The references to Wittgenstein are late additions and in-
cidental to his theory. And they are not intended to articulate a theory of concepts;
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they are intended to be an example of learning similarity relations without learning
explicit rules. The focus of Structure is paradigms, both regarded as shared commit-
ments of scientific community and as a particular set of commitments, the shared
exemplars. The latter constitute Kuhn’s most significant innovation, and are, I sug-
gest, best understood with the tools of cognitive psychology, in particular with the
aid of research on pattern recognition, analogical thinking, and case-based reason-
ing. What I say about Structure may be consistent with what ABC say about Kuhn, if
Kuhn developed a later theory of scientific revolutions, one radically different from
that in Structure. But they present no compelling evidence that he did.
Kuhn did develop a later theory of taxonomic incommensurability, and ABC’s
scholarship is very helpful in showing how the frame theory of concepts may illu-
minate and develop that theory. Since incommensurability is not central to Kuhn’s
account of scientific revolutions, this fact does not license the bold claim the ‘all of
the important features of Kuhn’s model’ are consequences of the frame account of
concepts. Rather, what ABC have done is show how the frame account and taxo-
nomic incommensurability may be central elements of some scientific revolutions
and parts (but not the only parts) of other scientific revolutions; we must note that
they may also be absent from some scientific revolutions. That important restriction
on what the frame account can do matches the fact that we can find anomalies and
scientific revolutions that simply do not fit their model.
To the historical examples adduced to support the last claim, at least as regard
revolutions, two responses are conceivable. The first will say that my examples of
revolutions are not true Kuhnian revolutions. For example, the revolutions ensuing
from the discoveries of the structure of DNA and of the structure of the atomic nu-
cleus are not revolutions because they are not revisionary. Or the discovery of the
cause of stomach ulcers is not revolutionary because it is small scale. Such a re-
sponse would not be true to Kuhn’s aims. Kuhn is explicit that although the most
important characteristics of scientific revolutions emerge from study of grant revo-
lutions (such s the Newtonian or chemical revolutions), ‘It is . . . a fundamental thesis
of this essay [structure] that they can also be retrieved from the study of many other
episodes that were not so obviously revolutionary’ (Kuhn 1970: 6). Non-revisionary
changes often do involve competition between often radically different theories and
the development of new paradigms and exemplars, and they can show incommen-
surability. And Kuhn himself came to regard the development of new specialties as
important, seeing the process as analogous to speciation.
In any case, I see no reason why important revisionary changes should necessar-
ily be accompanied by taxonomic changes. Not all science involves taxonomy. Not
all changes in belief imply a change of taxonomy, even where the latter is present.
An important change in the transition from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics is the
move from thinking that all motion requires explanation to thinking that it is only
non-uniform motion that needs explaining; that does not look as if it can be neatly
explained as a taxonomic change. Furthermore, scientific revolutions can centre on
changes in practice and technique, and these are even further removed from taxo-
nomic change. ABC (2006: 33) do note, it should be acknowledged, that it is a pos-
sible shortcoming of their account that it provides only limited insight into ‘nomic’
concepts. Normic concepts are those acquired though learning similarity (and dif-
ference) relations by ostension; these are the concepts to which their theory applies.
Nomic concepts are acquired via the complex problem situations in which the con-
cept and the law in which it figures are applied. ABC say that Kuhn did not give an
account of how to identify the referents of individual nomic concepts in such cases.
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This restriction on the application of their theory is potentially very significant. For
it could be argued that very few scientific concepts are normic by this characterisa-
tion, since not many scientific concepts are introduced by ostension (the concepts
discussed in their example of nuclear physics would be excluded by this criterion).
ABC say it would be hubristic to claim a complete account of all scientific concepts;
if so, then they are not in a position to claim to give a general account of scientific
change. As it is, I think that accepting limitations on the reach of their theory is the
correct response.
The second kind of response aims to maintain much of the universality of ABC’s
claim by being liberal with what counts as taxonomic change. In particular, they
might argue that I have not appreciated the significance of the ‘constraints’ that op-
erate between taxonomic categories. Beliefs act as such constraints and so revisions
to such beliefs do lead to taxonomic change. The danger with this approach is that is
makes the theory less informative while also diverting the focus. Too much counts
as conceptual change (any belief change has that effect). More importantly, let us
imagine that we can come up with Aristotelian and Newtonian frames such that
the explanatory shift mentioned above can be represented as a conceptual change.
How would that help us understand what is important about that shift? Would that
explain, for example, why Galileo’s physics (proto-Newtonian in this regard) was dif-
ficult for many Aristotelians to understand fully?
It strikes me that the undue emphasis on conceptual change is a hangover, albeit
in an up-to-date and scientifically well-informed guise, of the linguistic approach
to philosophy. For several decades many analytic philosophers thought that philo-
sophical problems were always linguistic in character. Now this is not a widespread
view, especially as naturalism has become more common in philosophy. Appealing
to a sophisticated account of concepts from cognitive science is a way of working
within the naturalistic paradigm while hanging onto the older conviction that lan-
guage is all. But it is not everything, not even in cognitive science. So while we
should welcome the insights offered by ABC we should not regard those insights
as explaining everything that Kuhn wanted to explain; to do so is to adopt the same
procrustean approach offered by the old linguistic philosophy. Rather those insights
should be deployed alongside other discoveries and theories in cognitive science
that are not conceptual in focus, for example the work on analogy, case based rea-
soning, cognitive habits, and quasi-intuitive connections that I sketched above in
section 2. With a broader set of explanatory tools, I believe that we can come closer
to showing how cognitive science can vindicate many of Kuhn’s most interesting
claims in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.8
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